Privileged AD object with permissions allowing takeover by regular user
Cayosoft Threat Definition CTD-000130
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Risk Summary
Weak or misconfigured permissions on privileged Active Directory objects can allow a non-privileged account to take control of them. This enables attackers to escalate privileges, maintain persistence, and evade detection while accessing sensitive resources.
- Severity: Critical
- Platform: Active Directory
- Category: Account Protection
- MITRE ATT&CK Tactics: Persistence, Privilege Escalation
- MITRE D3FEND Tactics: Application Configuration Hardening
Description
Active Directory objects — such as users, computers, and groups — have Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) that determine who can perform operations on them. If these lists are overly permissive, regular users could:
1.) Reset privileged account passwords (ForceChangePassword)
2.) Gain full control (GenericAll)
3.) Write arbitrary attributes (GenericWrite)
4.) Take ownership (WriteOwner)
5.) Add themselves to privileged groups (Self-Membership)
Cayosoft Guardian continuously monitors DACL changes for high-risk objects such as domain controllers, the domain root, the Domain Controllers OU, and privileged groups like DnsAdmins and Domain Admins.
Privileged accounts are defined in AD as those with adminCount=1 (Microsoft reference).
Real-World Scenario
A helpdesk technician’s account is compromised.
Due to misconfigured permissions, this account has GenericAll rights over the DnsAdmins group.
The attacker adds their own account to DnsAdmins, then uses this elevated position to execute code on domain controllers through DNS service privileges.
From there, they extract Domain Admin credentials and move laterally through the environment.
Cayosoft Guardian would have detected the excessive permission assignment in real time, preventing escalation.
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How to Detect (Cayosoft Guardian)
1.) Sign in to Cayosoft Guardian Threat Detection Dashboard.
2.) Select All Alerts and search for CTD-000130 or “permissions allowing takeover by regular user”.
3.) Open any alert and Click for details (from Raise Threat Alert action).
4.) Review Evidence:
- Principal
- Principal Sid
- Permissions
Remediation Steps
1.) Press View > Advanced features.
2.) Locate the object with abusable permissions.
3.) Right-click on it, and select Properties.
4.) Select the Security tab.
5.) Remove unwanted users or groups from the list.
6.) Click OK to save the permission settings.
How to Prevent It
Cayosoft Guardian can proactively detect and alert on privileged AD objects with takeover-capable permissions.
Limit delegation of high-impact rights, audit ACLs regularly, and ensure that only authorized administrators can modify sensitive objects.
FAQ
The adminCount=1 attribute marks an object as privileged and applies special permissions from AdminSDHolder. While it protects objects from accidental permission inheritance, a misconfiguration can hide risky access rights.
Members of the DnsAdmins group can load arbitrary DLLs into the DNS service on domain controllers. This allows code execution with system privileges and full control over the infrastructure.
Excessively permissive ACLs let regular users perform critical actions such as resetting passwords, modifying attributes, or adding themselves to privileged groups. This creates a direct path for privilege escalation and domain compromise.
Final Thought
Monitoring and correcting dangerous ACLs on privileged objects is critical to preventing privilege escalation in AD. By closing these misconfiguration gaps, you can block one of the most direct paths to domain compromise.